


STAT

Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5



Revised March 1971

Massachusetts Institute of Technology  
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Center for International Studies  
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Arms Control Project

CASCON

FACTOR CODING FORMS

Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5

CASCON Factor Coding Form

INSTRUCTIONS

In connection with our earlier research on local conflicts, i.e. small wars and near-wars other than those in which both superpowers were directly involved, under the sponsorship of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, we devised a dynamic model according to which all conflicts can go through a number of standard phases. Phase I is when a Dispute begins. Phase II is the beginning of a Conflict, signalled by at least one side viewing the dispute in potentially military terms. If hostilities break out the Conflict is in Phase III, within which it can intensify (escalate) or not. If fighting ends but the conflict remains, it is Phase IV; if only the dispute remains it is Phase V. Ideally the case can go to Settlement any time.

Between each Phase is a threshold marking the point of transition. Within each Phase we identified Factors, that is events, facts, situations, and the like, which we believed influenced the direction of the conflict toward or away from violence, i.e. were Conflict-Promoting or Conflict-Minimizing. Each Factor was considered to be influential on the course of the conflict, tending toward or away from violence. (We were of course aware that avoidance of violence is not necessarily always the prime objective. Our chief concern was in finding solutions to conflicts, particularly those that could involve the nuclear powers.)

We have now developed an experimental pilot model of a computerized system for handling such information on local conflict (CASCON), with the aim of supplying to the official facing an incipient (or critical) local conflict situation both an aid to his memory (through speedy retrieval of factors in similar past conflicts), and an aid to his imagination (through statistical computer analyses of similar combinations of factors, along with related conflict-controlling measures that might be relevant to the new conflict). We have amassed tentative lists of factors, along with relevant policy measures, for about half of the local conflicts that have taken place since 1945. From these we have developed the attached general list of factors classified by subject within Phases I, II, and III. (For purposes of this experimental pilot system we are considering P-IV factors as the same as P-II, and new hostilities as new P-III's.)

Both the United Nations and governments have already found the pilot CASCON system potentially useful. Your expert knowledge of the relevance and strength of factors tending either toward or away from violence will help to make this system an even more useful tool to national and UN officials, as well as scholars, who share a concern for minimizing conflicts and avoiding great power war.

Some Points to Remember

1. Each statement can have only one box checked.
2. Please do not modify the statements in any way before you answer. If you feel that there is something about this case that had influence but is not in our list, please add it at the end of the form on the supplemental sheets provided.
3. Remember, many of these statements may not be appropriate (i.e. not present) in your case. Therefore please do not be discouraged if you continually check the same box each time.
4. Also remember that these statements have been drawn from a number of local conflicts, some interstate and some internal. Therefore you may think some statements are not relevant in your case because you are considering one which is internal (or interstate) and the statement clearly relates to one which is interstate (internal). Do not leave the statement blank, rather just check "not present."
5. We use the words "ally" and "supporter" to mean a nation or other party who is in some way committed to one of the sides involved. This may be a treaty commitment, an ideological commitment, or some other general commitment.
6. In case of a factor that changed during the course of the Phase, its effect and influence should be coded as of early in the Phase.
7. For purposes of this analysis we assume there are 2 sides to each conflict, and one can be identified as the "status quo" side, the other the "non-status quo" side, referring not to ideology but to who is attacking whom.

P H A S E I

CASE: \_\_\_\_\_

"STATUS QUO" SIDE: \_\_\_\_\_

"NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE: \_\_\_\_\_

DATE PHASE BEGAN: \_\_\_\_\_

CODER: \_\_\_\_\_

PHASE I-1.		NOT A FACTOR		A FACTOR		FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE	
		FACTOR TENDS TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE				FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE	
		NO INFLUENCE		NO PRESENT INFLUENCE		LITTLE INFLUENCE	
		1	2	3	4	5	6
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5		GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS		MUCH INFLUENCE		SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE
I. PREVIOUS OR GENERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN SIDES * * * * *		1. Area of dispute was object of competing claims.		7		8	9
2. Agents of one side have infiltrated and undermined political structure of other side.		3. The opposition in the disputed area had managed to liquidate or absorb any potential "middle-ground."		4. One side was controlled politically by the other.		5. One side had previously supported the other, leaving a legacy of goodwill between the two sides.	
6. Both sides had previously agreed to settle further disputes peaceably.		7. One side sought friendly relations with the other side.					

PHASE I-2.		A FACTOR		NOT A FACTOR		FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE		FACTOR TENDS TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE		NOT PRESENT INFLUENCE		PRESENT INFLUENCE		NOT TRUE INFO.		NO INFO.		NOT PRESENT INFLUENCE		NO INFLUENCE		MUCH INFLUENCE		SOME INFLUENCE		LITTLE INFLUENCE		MUCH INFLUENCE		SOME INFLUENCE		LITTLE INFLUENCE	
1. Insufficient information, check box one (1)																																	
2. Situation not present or true, check box two (2)																																	
3. Present but no influence, check box three (3)																																	
4. Not a factor, check as appropriate 4,5,6,7,8, or 9																																	
For GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS																																	
The two sides to the dispute were historic enemies.																																	
One side suspicious of intentions of other side.																																	
One side opposed the present form of government of the other side.																																	
One side had been historically dominant in region.																																	
Leaders of one side were nostalgic over historical memory of lost empire.																																	
The "status quo" side had had success in dealing with a comparable threat in another country.																																	
Revolt in disputed area gave substance to charges that it did not want to become part of "status quo" side.																																	
A party linked to a superpower was the strongest force in the "non-status quo" side.																																	

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PHASE I-4		A FACTOR		NOT A FACTOR						
				FACTOR TENDS TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE			FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE			
				MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE	
				1	2	3	4	5	6	7
				INFO.	NOT TRUE	PRESENT	NO INFLUENCE	INFLUENCE	INFLUENCE	9
1. If insufficient information, check box one (1)										
2. If situation not present or true, check box two (2)										
3. If present but no influence, check box three (3)										
4. If a factor, check as appropriate 4,5,6,7,8, or 9										
For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5										
22. A strong ally of one side was unwilling to use its force in the region.										
23. Great power concerns led to the introduction of foreign troops into the territory of one side.										
24. Involved great powers did not encourage close relations between the two parties.										
25. Involved great powers did encourage such close relations.										
26. Increasingly close ties between the "non-status quo" side and one great power made possible development of former as base for latter's penetration in the region.										
27. While support from one great power for one side was increasing, latter's proximity to closer great power tended to isolate that side in the event of a showdown.										

## PHASE I-5.

NOT A FACTOR		A FACTOR		FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE							
				MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE		
				1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
				NO INFO.	NOT PRESENT	INFO. PRESENT	NO INFLUENCE	INFO. PRESENT	NOT PRESENT	INFO. PRESENT	NO INFLUENCE
1. Insufficient information, check box one (1)											
2. In situation not present or true, check box two (2)											
3. In present but no influence, check box three (3)											
4. If a factor, check as appropriate 4,5,6,7,8, or 9											
GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS											
28. One side was receiving material support from a great power ally.											
29. Historic rivalry made each great power reluctant to see introduction of the other's forces into the area.											
30. Great power dispute led to competition for favor of one side's leadership.											
31. Relations of "non-status quo" side with one great power had become closer, while relations with another had cooled.											
32. One superpower's interest in removing other's military bases coincided with the "non-status quo" side's desires.											
33. Rivalries among two great power allies of "non-status quo" side made each unwilling to restrain "non-status quo" side leadership lest other ally profit.											

## PHASE I-6.

NOT A FACTOR	A FACTOR				
	FACTOR TENDS TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE				
	MUCH	SOME	LITTLE	MUCH	SOME
	INFLUENCE	INFLUENCE	INFLUENCE	INFLUENCE	INFLUENCE
	NO INFO.	NOT PRESENT	INFO PRESENT	NO INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5	1	2	3	4	5
1. Insufficient information, check box one (1)					
2. If situation not present or true, check box two (2)					
3. If present but no influence, check box three (3)					
4. If a factor, check as appropriate 4,5,6,7,8, or 9					
GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS					
III EXTERNAL RELATIONS GENERALLY					
* * * * *					
34. One side's attention was focused on conflict with an outside party.					
35. Major allies of the "status quo" side did not favor its policy toward the disputed area.					
36. No buffer areas separated the two sides.					
37. Nationalist hopes in the disputed area were stimulated by occupation troops.					
38. One side sought to gain support from outside party.					
39. One side did not seek external support.					
40. One external party had given both sides money and material support.					

## PHASE I-7.

		A FACTOR						
		NOT A FACTOR						
		FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE						
		NO INFO.	NOT PRESENT	INFO. PRESENT	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE	MUCH INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE
Approved For Release	2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1.	insufficient information, check box one (1)							
2.	situation not present or true, check box two (2)							
3.	present but no influence, check box three (3)							
4.	a factor, check as appropriate 4,5,6,7,8, or 9							
GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS								
41.	Primary ally of one side dependent on the other side and its allies for military and economic support.							
42.	An outside party who had previously controlled the disputed area had unsuccessfully fixed the border.							
43.	Border had earlier been successfully fixed.							
44.	Dispute threatened stability and security of the whole region.							
45.	Majority group of one side favored union with culturally similar country.							
46.	Political turmoil of outside party infected its brothers in one side.							
IV. MILITARY STRATEGIC								
47.	A military resistance organization had been formed to fight an invader.	*	*	*	*	*	*	*

PHASE I-8.		A FACTOR		FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE		FACTOR TENDS TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE		NOT A FACTOR	
		NO INFO.	NOT PRESENT	NO INFLUENCE	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE
1. Insufficient information, check box one (1)									
2. If situation not present or true, check box two (2)									
3. If present but no influence, check box three (3)									
4. If a factor, check as appropriate 4,5,6,7,8, or 9									
GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
48. One side mistrusted independent status of other side because of presence of foreign military bases.									
49. There were no foreign military bases.									
50. Forces of the "status quo" side in the disputed area were heavily dependent on outside logistic support.									
51. "Status quo" side did not have many forces in the disputed area.									
52. "Status quo" side had substantial forces in the disputed area.									
53. Military situation in the area clearly in favor of the "status quo" side.									
54. Military situation in the area clearly in favor of the "non-status quo" side.									

## PHASE I-9.

NOT A FACTOR	A FACTOR	FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE				
NO INFO.	NOT TRUE/PRESENT	NO INFLUENCE				
GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE
1. Insufficient information, check box one (1)	1	2	3	4	5	6
2. In situation not present or true, check box two (2)						
3. In present but no influence, check box three (3)						
4. In a factor, check as appropriate 4,5,6,7,8, or 9						
55. One side had extensive training and/or experience in guerrilla and terrorist tactics.						
56. A strong ally of one side had military force in the region.						
57. "Non-status quo" side able to acquire large stocks of arms and ammunition as a result of a previous conflict.						
58. The "non-status quo" side had general military superiority.						
59. The "status quo" side had general military superiority.						
60. The disputed area was of strategic importance to "status quo" side.						
61. The disputed area was of strategic importance to the "non-status quo" side.						

Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5

## PHASE I-10.

		A FACTOR		NOT A FACTOR			
1.	An insufficient information, check box one (1)			FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE			
2.	situation not present or true, check box two (2)						
3.	present but no influence, check box three (3)						
4.	For a factor, check as appropriate 4,5,6,7,8, or 9						
GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS		NOT PRESENT NO INFO.	PRESENT NO INFO.	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE	SMALL INFLUENCE
		1	2	3	4	5	6
62.	An active military force existed which was against the "non-status quo" side although not allied with "status quo" side.						
63.	One side militarily weak and powerless to resist.						
V.	INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (U.N. AND REGIONAL; LEGAL; WORLD PUBLIC OPINION) * * * * *						
64.	Border between sides was uncertain.						
65.	Border between sides was clearly defined.						
66.	Legal status of disputed area was ambiguous.						
67.	"Non-status quo" side concerned with world reaction to its moves against the other side.						
68.	World opinion favored the cause of the "non-status quo" side.						
69.	World opinion favored the cause of the "status quo" side.						

Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5

## PHASE I-11.

NOT A FACTOR		A FACTOR		FACTORS TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE		FACTORS TEND TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE		NO INFLUENCE		NOT PRESENT		TRUE/NO INFO.		NO INFLUENCE		NOT PRESENT		TRUE/NO INFO.		NOT A FACTOR		
1. Insufficient information, check box one (1)																						
2. If situation not present or true, check box two (2)																						
3. If present but no influence, check box three (3)																						
4. If a factor, check as appropriate 4,5,6,7,8, or 9																						
GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS																						
70 Already much international organization activity to settle the dispute peacefully.																						
71 There was no involvement yet of international organization.																						
72 One side had signed international agreements that prohibited threat or use of force.																						
73 Action of a regional security organization was weak.																						
74 Action of a regional security organization was strong.																						
75 Racial divisions within the disputed area disadvantaged the "non-status quo" side.																						

Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5

ETHNIC (REFUGEES, NOMADS, MINORITIES, ETC.)

\* \* \* \* \*

75. Racial divisions within the disputed area disadvantaged the "non-status quo" side.

## PHASE I-12.

		NOT A FACTOR		A FACTOR			
		FACTORY TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE		FACTORY TENDS TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE			
		NO PRESENT INFO.		NOT PRESENT INFO.			
		MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE
		1	2	3	4	5	6
1.	Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5	Insufficient information, check box one (1)					
2.		Situation not present or true, check box two (2)					
3.		Present but no influence, check box three (3)					
4.		For a factor, check as appropriate 4,5,6,7,8, or 9					
		GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS					
76.		Racial divisions within the disputed area favored the "non-status quo" side.					
77.		Immigrants from one side to disputed area competed with the indigenous population.					
78.		Immigrants from one side to disputed area increased tension.					
79.		The impending emergence of an independent homogeneous state provided focus for aspirations of similar people living elsewhere.					
80.		One side had access to refugees or irregular forces of the other side to use as a proxy force.					
81.		Areas adjacent to "non-status quo" side contained people who aspired to join their brethren.					
82.		Conflict for scarce resources among nomadic groups brought them into conflict with the nominal sovereign of the region.					

Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5

31

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Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5

A FACTOR		NOT A FACTOR	
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5		Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5	
FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE	FACTOR TENDS TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE	FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE	FACTOR TENDS TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE
NO INFO.	NO INFO.	NO INFO.	NO INFO.
NOT PRESENT	NOT PRESENT	NOT PRESENT	NOT PRESENT
NO INFLUENCE	NO INFLUENCE	NO INFLUENCE	NO INFLUENCE
LITTLE INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	MUCH INFLUENCE
INFLUENCE NO IN-	INFLUENCE NO IN-	INFLUENCE SOME	INFLUENCE MUCH
TRUE	TRUE	INFLUENCE LITTLE	INFLUENCE LITTLE
GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS			
1	2	3	4
5	6	5	7
6	7	8	9
7	8	9	9
8	9	9	9
9	9	9	9
83 Long history of distrust between ethnic groups.	83 Long history of distrust between ethnic groups.	83 Long history of distrust between ethnic groups.	83 Long history of distrust between ethnic groups.
84 Population in disputed area poorly integrated.			
85 Large and powerful pressure groups of refugees and their supporters were created.	85 Large and powerful pressure groups of refugees and their supporters were created.	85 Large and powerful pressure groups of refugees and their supporters were created.	85 Large and powerful pressure groups of refugees and their supporters were created.
86 Both sides had economic and social problems in dealing with refugees.	86 Both sides had economic and social problems in dealing with refugees.	86 Both sides had economic and social problems in dealing with refugees.	86 Both sides had economic and social problems in dealing with refugees.
ECONOMIC * * * * *			
87 "Non status-quo" side derived much economic advantage from other side.	87 "Non status-quo" side derived much economic advantage from other side.	87 "Non status-quo" side derived much economic advantage from other side.	87 "Non status-quo" side derived much economic advantage from other side.
88 "Status quo" side derived much economic advantage from "non-status quo" side.	88 "Status quo" side derived much economic advantage from "non-status quo" side.	88 "Status quo" side derived much economic advantage from "non-status quo" side.	88 "Status quo" side derived much economic advantage from "non-status quo" side.
89 Area in dispute economically important to both sides.	89 Area in dispute economically important to both sides.	89 Area in dispute economically important to both sides.	89 Area in dispute economically important to both sides.
90 Economic policy of one side was exploitative.	90 Economic policy of one side was exploitative.	90 Economic policy of one side was exploitative.	90 Economic policy of one side was exploitative.
91 "Status quo" side was dependent on external economic assistance.	91 "Status quo" side was dependent on external economic assistance.	91 "Status quo" side was dependent on external economic assistance.	91 "Status quo" side was dependent on external economic assistance.



		A FACTOR					
		FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE					
		NOT A FACTOR					
		NO INFO. NOT PRESENT NO INFLUENCE	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE
1.	Insufficient information, check box one (1)	1	2	3	4	5	6
2.	Situation not present or true, check box two (2)						
3.	Present but no influence, check box three (3)						
4.	Identified a factor, check as appropriate 4,5,6,7,8, or 9						
<b>GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS</b>							
100.	One side witnessed success of other groups against the opposing side.						
101.	"Status quo" side moved toward a greater degree of self-government for the "non-status quo" side.						
102.	"Status quo" side denied a greater degree of self-government for the "non-status quo" side.						
103.	Armed forces in disputed area unable or unwilling to support its government.						
104.	Internal security forces of one side inadequate to deal with situation in disputed area.						
<b>CHARACTERISTICS OF ONE SIDE</b>							
		* * * * *					
		Leaders of one side shared same political ideology as leaders in disputed area.					

Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5

Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5

IX.2-5

## PHASE I-16.

		A FACTOR				
		NOT A FACTOR				
		FACTOR TENDS TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE				
		FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE				
		NO INFO.	NOT PRESENT	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE
		INFO TRUE	INFO PRESENT	INFO 4	INFO 5	INFO 6
		INFO NO	INFO NO	INFO 3	INFO 2	INFO 1
1. Insufficient information, check box one (1)						
2. If situation not present or true, check box two (2)						
3. If present but no influence, check box three (3)						
4. If a factor, check as appropriate 4,5,6,7,8, or 9						
GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS						
10. Head of one side had family ties in area of dispute.						
11. The leaders of one side were preoccupied with consolidating their internal hegemony and restoring order.						
12. Leaders of "non-status quo" side did not want to intervene overtly against the other side.						
13. Leaders of "status quo" side did not want to intervene overtly against the other side.						
14. The "status quo" side avoided any direct provocation.						
15. Not all leaders of the "non-status quo" side were willing to resort to violence.						
16. One side had been focusing its attention on other disputes.						
17. Both sides extremely nationalistic.						

Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5

Factor Tends Away From Increased Violence

Factor Tends Toward Increased Violence

Factor Tends Away

From Increased Violence

## PHASE I-17.

Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5

NOT A FACTOR	A FACTOR	FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE
NO INFO.	PRESENT	NO INFLUENCE
1. If insufficient information, check box one (1) 2. If situation not present or true, check box two (2) 3. If present but no influence, check box three (3) 4. If a factor, check as appropriate 4,5,6,7,8, or 9	FACTOR TENDS TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE	FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE
GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS	MUCH INFLUENCE 2	SOME INFLUENCE 3
	LITTLE INFLUENCE 1	LITTLE INFLUENCE 4
	MUCH INFLUENCE 5	SOME INFLUENCE 6
	LITTLE INFLUENCE 7	MUCH INFLUENCE 8
		LITTLE INFLUENCE 9
One side extremely nationalistic.		
One side, having won its independence by force, regarded as fraudulent any independence won by amicable agreement.		
Policy of one side was repressive, and provided few legitimate channels of dissent for other side.		
Personality and style of leader of one side favored grand gestures.		
The policies of one side created impression that it was oriented toward a neighboring great power's enemies.		
The unity of the "non-status quo" side shaken by a leadership crisis.		
The unity of the "status quo" side shaken by a leadership crisis.		
Internal political divisions within one side led its ruling regime to search for a unifying issue.		

## PHASE I-18.

NOT A FACTOR	A FACTOR				
	FACTOR TENDS TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE				
	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE
	1	2	3	4	5
GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS					
1. Insufficient information, check box one (1)					
2. Situation not present or true, check box two (2)					
3. If present but no influence, check box three (3)					
4. If a factor, check as appropriate 4,5,6,7,8, or 9					
NOT PRESENT / NO INFO.	1	2	3	4	5
PRESENT / NO INFO.					
PRESENT / TRUE / NO INFO.					
FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE					
1. One side considered itself to have a "mission" to carry out its policy.					
2. One side considered itself culturally superior.					
3. Public opinion in one side switched from support of other side to opposition.					
4. The "status quo" side was very cohesive.					
5. The "non-status quo" side's base of support was badly split.					
6. The "status quo" side's base of support was badly split.					
7. Many individuals on one side owed allegiance to an outside organization.					
8. One side, although outnumbered, had political, economic, and social power and monopolized the material benefits of the area.					
9. The "non-status quo" side's main vehicle of action hitherto unsuccessful.					

PHASE I-19.		NOT A FACTOR		A FACTOR								
		NO INFLUENCE NOT TRUE. NO INFO.	FACTOR TENDS TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE	MUCH INFLUENCE 1	SOME INFLUENCE 2	LITTLE INFLUENCE 3	MUCH INFLUENCE 4	SOME INFLUENCE 5	LITTLE INFLUENCE 6	MUCH INFLUENCE 7	SOME INFLUENCE 8	LITTLE INFLUENCE 9
1.	Insufficient information, check box one (1)											
2.	If situation not present or true, check box two (2)											
3.	Represent but no influence, check box three (3)											
4.	If a factor, check as appropriate 4,5,6,7,8, or 9											
	GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS											
	The "non-status quo" side's main vehicle of action hitherto successful.											
	COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION											
	* * * * *											
	Normal diplomatic channels between the two sides were disrupted.											
	Good communications between the two sides was disrupted.											
	Little accurate information available to the sides regarding situation in the disputed area.											
	Accurate information available to the sides regarding situation in the disputed area.											
	ACTIONS OR CONTROLS IN THE DISPUTED AREA											
	* * * * *											
	137. Incidents in the disputed area increased in seriousness and number.											
	138. The proximity of one side to the disputed area and its greater power gave it great influence.											

## PHASE I-20.

		A FACTOR				
		NOT A FACTOR				
		FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE				
		NOT PRESENT INFO.	NOT PRESENT INFO.	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE
		NO INFO.	NO INFO.	4	5	6
		NOT TRUE	NOT TRUE	3	4	5
		PRESENT	PRESENT	2	3	4
		INFO.	INFO.	1	2	3
		GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS				
139		One side followed a policy of repression against political groups in the disputed area.				
140		One side followed a policy of toleration vis a vis political groups in the disputed area.				
141		One side engaging in fomenting and encouraging rebellious groups in the region.				
142		A majority of the residents of the disputed area registered their desire for accession to the other side.				
143		The "non-status quo" party was in unchallenged control of the disputed area.				
144		The "status quo" party was in unchallenged control of the disputed area.				

P H A S E      II

CASE: \_\_\_\_\_  
"STATUS QUO" SIDE: \_\_\_\_\_  
"NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE: \_\_\_\_\_  
DATE PHASE BEGAN: \_\_\_\_\_  
CODER: \_\_\_\_\_

Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5

PHASE III-1.		NOT A FACTOR		A FACTOR		A FACTOR	
		FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE		FACTOR TENDS TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE		FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE	
		NO INFLUENCE		NO INFLUENCE		NO INFLUENCE	
		1	2	3	4	5	6
		MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE
		7	8	9	7	8	9
1. Insufficient information, check box one (1) If situation not present or true, check box two (2) If present but no influence, check box three (3) If a factor, check as appropriate 4,5,6,7,8, or 9							
2. GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS							
3. PREVIOUS OR GENERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN SIDES * * * * *							
4. One side fails to achieve influence over the other by non-military means.							
5. One side succeeds in achieving influence over the other by non-military means.							
6. Time grows short during which an opportunity can be exploited.							
7. The "non-status quo" party believes that the other party will never yield to its demands.							
8. Police or military measures taken by one side to counter potential threat of other side increase latter's desire to change the status quo.							
9. One side agrees to participate in negotiations.							
10. One side refuses to participate in negotiations.							
11. Deep ideological split develops between the two sides.							



## PHASE III-3.

		A FACTOR			
		NOT A FACTOR			
		FACTOR TENDS TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE		FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE	
		NOT PRESENT / TRUE	NO INFLUENCE	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE
		NO INFO.	NO INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE
1.	Approved insufficient information, check box one (1)				
2.	If situation not present or true, check box two (2)				
3.	If present but no influence, check box three (3)				
4.	If a factor, check as appropriate 4,5,6,7,8, or 9				
GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS		1	2	3	4
18. For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M0096A000500010012-5					
19. GREAT POWER INVOLVEMENT * * * * *					
One side discounts the threat of the other side's ally to intervene.					
20. Major ally of "non-status quo" side strongly prefers a peaceful settlement.					
21. Major ally of "non-status quo" side shows no preference for a peaceful settlement.					
22. U.S. public opinion is generally more favorable toward the "non-status quo" side.					
23. U.S. policy at this time appears to be friendly to the aims of the "non-status quo" side.					
24. The United States is impartial in the conflict at this stage.					
25. Other superpower(s) are impartial in the conflict at this stage.					

Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M0096A000500010012-5

## PHASE II-4.

NOT A FACTOR	A FACTOR			FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE			FACTOR TENDS TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE			NOT A FACTOR
	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE	
1. Insufficient information, check box one (1)										
2. In situation not present or true, check box two (2)										
3. Ind present but no influence, check box three (3)										
4. If a factor, check as appropriate 4,5,6,7,8, or 9										
GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
26. Other superpower(s) are not impartial in the conflict at this stage.										
27. The United States urges both sides to settle the dispute through direct talks.										
28. The major allies of each side agree that the disputed area is in the sphere of influence of one of them.										
29. The major allies of each side are not in agreement that the disputed area is in the sphere of influence of one of them.										
30. EXTERNAL RELATIONS GENERALLY										
* * * * *										
31. Splits within one side are exacerbated by ideological struggles within the region.										
The "status quo" side's major ally is distracted by other conflicts and thus gives relatively low priority to the "status quo" side.										

Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5

## PHASE II-5.

		A FACTOR					
		NOT A FACTOR					
		FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE					
		NO INFLUENCE / NOT TRUE	NO INFO / PRESENT	INFO / NO PRESENT	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE
		1	2	3	4	5	6
GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS							
31. If insufficient information, check box one (1) If present but no influence, check box three (3) If a factor, check as appropriate 4,5,6,7,8, or 9							
32. One side feels that an outside party with much influence in disputed area is not fulfilling prior commitments.							
33.: Leaders of a third party that is engaged in a conflict with one side of this dispute seek assistance from the other side.							
34. Some of the clashes in the disputed area involve persons not under the control of either side.							
35. One side engaged in repressive action against neighbor of the other side.							
36. A third party in a position to influence both sides does not attempt to stop one side from carrying out this conflict.							
37. A third party in a position to influence both sides does attempt to stop one side from carrying out this conflict.							
38. Settlement of another conflict leaves the "non-status quo" side free to concentrate on this conflict.							

## PHASE III-6.

NOT A FACTOR	A FACTOR	FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE	FACTOR TENDS TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE				
NO INFO. NOT TRUE/ PRESENT NO INFLUENCE	NO INFO. NOT TRUE/ PRESENT NO INFLUENCE	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE
<b>GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS</b>							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
39. The "non-status quo" side is tied up in another conflict.							
40. Successful efforts of similar groups elsewhere : provide a model for the "non-status quo" side.							
41. A neutral third party is believed by one side to be a cover for the other.							
<b>IV. MILITARY - STRATEGIC</b>							
42. The military balance is sharply in favor of the "status quo" side.							
43. The military balance is not in favor of the "status quo" side.							
44. "Status quo" side has military superiority in the disputed area.							
45. "Non-status quo" side has military superiority in the disputed area increases.							
46. The strategic interest of the "status quo" side in the disputed area increases.							

Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5

## PHASE II-7.

		NOT A FACTOR		A FACTOR			
		NO INFLUENCE		FACTOR TENDS TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE		FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE	
		NOT PRESENT	PRESENT	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE	NO INFLUENCE
		1	2	3	4	5	6
For GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS							
47.	The "non-status quo" side agrees to place its military forces under the command of a neutral leader.						
48.	There is a weak countervailing military force near the disputed area.						
49.	CIA forces in the disputed area are inadequate and regular military forces are used, thus alienating the "non-status quo" side.						
50.	One side is able to obtain quantities of arms and ammunition left over from another conflict.						
51.	One side sends troops to the disputed area.						
52.	The "status quo" side reinforces its garrison in the disputed area.						
53.	Both sides strengthen their military forces in the disputed area.						
54.	One side increases its capability to deploy military forces in the disputed area.						
55.	Broader strategic requirements place a high priority on avoiding a situation in the disputed area that would interfere with great power relationships.						

		NOT A FACTOR		A FACTOR			
		FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE		FACTOR TENDS TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE			
		NO INFLUENCE / PRESENT TRUE / NO INFO.		NO INFLUENCE / PRESENT TRUE / NO INFO.			
		MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE
		1	2	3	4	5	6
GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS							
56.	One side's military strength is growing.						
57.	Opposition parties in one side urge firmer policy toward other side.						
58.	CIA interprets "routine" troop movements by other side as a threat.						
59.	In effort to redress military balance in the area one side seeks foreign military assistance.						
60.	No foreign military assistance is sought.						
61.	One side able to exercise only limited control over its military forces.						
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (U.N. AND REGIONAL) ;							
LEGAL ; WORLD OPINION							
* * * * *							
62.	The United Nations urges the parties to negotiate a settlement.						
63.	The United Nations takes other action.						
64.	The United Nations fails to take action.						

## PHASE II-9.

		NOT A FACTOR			A FACTOR					
		NO INFO/	INFO PRESENT	NO INFLUENCE	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS										
65. International agreements exist to which one side and the allies of the other are parties, prohibiting intervention in the affairs of the other side.										
66. Regional organization takes action.										
67. Regional organization fails to take action.										
VI. ETHNIC (MINORITIES, REFUGEES)										
68. There is a substantial flow of refugees.										
69. One side regards its internal troubles with ethnic groups as having been inspired by the other side.										
70. Scale of clashes increases between one side and a dissident ethnic group.										
71. Discontent increases among one side's ethnic brethren within the other side.										
72. One side is committed to pursue the objective of unification of all members of the same ethnic group.										

Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5

## PHASE II-10.

Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5

PHASE II-10.		NOT A FACTOR		A FACTOR		A FACTOR	
		FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE		FACTOR TENDS TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE			
		NO INFO.		NOT TRUE		PRESENT	
		MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE
		1	2	3	4	5	6
GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS							
73. The rights of minority groups in the disputed area are guaranteed.							
74. The rights of minority groups in the disputed area are not guaranteed.							
75. Many on one side seeking particular goal are linked ethnically with people in a neighboring country that have achieved the same goal.							
76. Minority group in "non-status quo" side is not in favor of changing status quo.							
77. The economic value of the disputed area to both sides increases.							
78. The economic value of the disputed area to one side increases.							
79. The disputed area does not have important economic value.							

## PHASE III-11.

Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5

		NOT A FACTOR		A FACTOR			
		NO INFLUENCE / NOT INFO.		FACTOR TENDS TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE		FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE	
		1	2	3	4	5	6
	GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS			MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE
80.	Economic policy of one side is exploitative.	1	2	3	4	5	6
81.	"Status quo" side is dependent on external economic assistance.						
82.	"Non-status quo" side is dependent on external economic assistance.						
	INTERNAL POLITICAL						
	* * * * *						
83.	Opposition parties in one side are pressing for more rapid achievement of the goal that would alter the status quo.						
84.	In the disputed area popular sentiment is overwhelmingly for a change in the status quo.						
85.	Domestic political situation of one side causes a heightening of public attention to the dispute.						
86.	Political opposition exists to government in power's policy vis-a-vis the other side.						
87.	Public opinion hardens against the other side.						

Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5

PHASE II-12.		A FACTOR		NOT A FACTOR	
		FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE		FACTOR TENDS TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE	
		NO INFO.	NOT PRESENT	NO INFLUENCE	MUCH INFLUENCE
		1	2	3	4
		5	6	7	8
		9			
GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS					
38.	"Status quo" side agrees to submit the disputed question to a plebiscite.				
39.	"Non-status quo" side agrees to submit the disputed question to a plebiscite.				
CIA CHARACTER OR ACTIONS OF ONE SIDE * * * * *					
40.	One side's policy increases in militancy.				
41.	One side's position in the dispute hardens to the point where it would contemplate negotiations only if the other side accepts its claim.				
42.	Opposition parties in one side are urging the use of force to achieve their side's goal.				
43.	One side shifts from downgrading the dispute to exaggerating it.				
44.	Experience of "non-status quo" side provides the structure, experience, and material means to carry on hostilities.				
45.	One side believes that unless action is taken soon, more extreme action will need to be taken.				

Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5

## PHASE II-14.

		NOT A FACTOR		A FACTOR			
		/ NO INFO.		NO INFLUENCE / PRESENT		FACTORS TEND AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE	
				MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE	MUCH INFLUENCE
		1	2	3	4	5	6
104	The "non-status quo" side believes it can win through political means.						
105	The "status quo" side believes it can win through political means.						
106	The leaders of one side believe that a limited amount of violence will give weight and urgency to diplomatic efforts.						
107	"Status quo" side concerned over world opinion.						
108	"Non-status quo" side concerned over world opinion.						
109	Aid received by one side increases prospect of its becoming a base for political action in the region.						
110	One side wishes to keep its role covert or indirect.						
111	One side is able to obtain a proxy force to carry out its policy.						



## PHASE II-16.

		A FACTOR				
		NOT A FACTOR				
		FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE				
		FACTOR TENDS TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE				
		NO INFO. NOT TRUE	PRESENT INFO.	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE
1.	Insufficient information, check box one (1)					
2.	For situation not present or true, check box two (2)					
3.	For present but no influence, check box three (3)					
4.	For a factor, check as appropriate 4,5,6,7,8, or 9					
GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS		1	2	3	4	5
Opposition parties in "status quo" side urge that it concede to the "non-status quo" side's demands.						
X. COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION * * * * *						
121 Normal diplomatic channels between the two sides are disrupted.						
122 Good communications between the two sides.						
123 Little accurate information available to the sides regarding situation in the disputed area.						
124 Accurate information available to the sides in the disputed area.						
XI. ACTIONS OR CONTROLS IN THE DISPUTED AREA * * * * *						
125 Incidents in the disputed area increase in seriousness and number.						

## PHASE II-17.

Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5

		NOT A FACTOR		A FACTOR			
		/ PRESENT NO INFO. NOT IN- FLUENCE		FACTOR TENDS TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE		FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE	
		MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE
	GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS	1	2	3	4	5	6
127	The proximity of one side to the disputed area and its greater power give it great influence.						
128	One side follows a policy of repression against political groups in the disputed area.						
129	One side follows a policy of toleration vis-a-vis political groups in the disputed area.						
130	One side uses its military presence in the disputed area to pursue long-held ideological, political, economic, and strategic goals.						
131	One side engaging in fomenting and encouraging rebellious groups in the region.						
132	One side charges that the other has fomented a revolt within its territory.						
133	A majority of the residents of the disputed area register their desire for accession to the other side.						
134	Each side establishes military posts in territory claimed by the other.						

PHASE II-18.

PHASE III

CASE: \_\_\_\_\_  
"STATUS QUO" SIDE: \_\_\_\_\_  
"NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE: \_\_\_\_\_  
DATE PHASE BEGAN: \_\_\_\_\_  
CODER: \_\_\_\_\_

## PHASE III-1.

		NOT A FACTOR		A FACTOR		FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE		FACTOR TENDS TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE			
		NO INFO.	NOT PRESENT	INFO. PRESENT	INFLUENCE NO IN-	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS											
1. PREVIOUS OR GENERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN SIDES											
* * * * *											
1. "Status quo" side removes leader of other side who could have restraining influence.											
2. One side warns other that any offensive action in the disputed area will result in war.											
3. Leader of one side heeds warning that harsh measures will result in action by the other side.											
4. Leader of one side desires to avoid war with other side.											
5. Both sides appear to have limited objectives in the hostilities.											
6. One or both sides do not appear to have limited objectives in the hostilities.											
7. The sides and their supporters are willing to seek a negotiated settlement.											
8. The "non-status quo" side indicates a willingness to discuss an end to hostilities.											

Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5

PHASE III-2.

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PHASE III-3.

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## PHASE III-5.

Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5

		NOT A FACTOR		A FACTOR			
		NOT TRUE / PRESENT BUT NO INFLUENCE		FACTOR TENDS TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE		FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE	
		NO INFO.	NOT PRESENT	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE	MINIMAL INFLUENCE
		1	2	3	4	5	6
1.	if insufficient information, check box one (1)						
2.	if situation not present or true, check box two (2)						
3.	if present but no influence, check box three (3)						
4.	For a factor, check as appropriate 4,5,6,7,8, or 9						
GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS							
		1	2	3	4	5	6
	The prestige of a superpower is perceived as being committed to settlement of the conflict.						
	Great power supporter of "non-status quo" side refuses to assure that side of assistance.						
	Great power supporter of "status quo" side refuses to assure that side of assistance.						
	A superpower appears to be neutral on the conflict.						
	A superpower is fearful that the conflict will grow into a much wider war.						
	EXTERNAL RELATIONS GENERALLY						
	* * * * *						
39.	One side receives assistance from one of its supporters.						
40.	Countries on whom the "non-status quo" side is dependent are unable or unwilling to give further support.						

Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5

A FACTOR		NOT A FACTOR	
FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE		FACTOR TENDS TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE	
NO INFLUENCE NOT PRESENT IN FO.	NO INFLUENCE NO IN- FO.	MUCH INFLUENCE 6	SOME INFLUENCE 5
GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS	1 2 3	4	5
41. Countries on whom the "status quo" side is dependent are unable or unwilling to give further support.			
42. Use of force by one side alienates potential allies.			
43. Armed forces of supporters of both sides do not become involved.			
44. Armed forces of supporters of both sides become involved.			
45. Supporter of one side threatens unilateral intervention.			
46. Other countries in the region provide training facilities and bases of operation for the "non-status quo" side.			
47. Other states in the region give material support to "non-status quo" side.			
48. External pressures for termination develop almost as soon as fighting breaks out.			



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## PHASE III-9.

Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5

		NOT A FACTOR		A FACTOR			
		NO INFLUENCE / NOT TRUE / NO INFO.		FACTOR TENDS TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE		FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE	
		1	2	3	4	5	6
GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS		MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE
65.	"Status quo" side's forces offer ineffective resistance and are unable to stop or deflect attack of "non-status quo" side.	1	2	3	4	5	6
66.	Force is being used, not with the expectation of military victory, but to add strength to diplomacy by threatening intensification to a wider war.						
67.	Commander in chief of one side's army advises against more military activity.						
68.	As a military force, one side never succeeded in moving beyond terrorism and isolated guerrilla "pockets."						
69.	One side unable to cut off supply of arms to other side.						
70.	One side resorts to guerrilla warfare.						
71.	The terrain is not suitable for guerrilla warfare.						
72.	Relatively uncontrollable military and paramilitary units act on their own initiative.						

PHASE III-10.

Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5



PHASE III-12.

Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5

## PHASE III-13.

		NOT A FACTOR		A FACTOR			
		FACTOR TENDS TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE		FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE			
		NO INFO.	NOT TRUE	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE	MUCH LITTLE INFLUENCE
1.	If insufficient information, check box one (1) Approved 2. If situation not present or true, check box two (2) 3. If present but no influence, check box three (3) 4. If a factor, check as appropriate 4,5,6,7,8, or 9	NO INFO.	NOT TRUE	1	2	3	4
97.	The United Nations does not assert itself strongly.						
98.	The United Nations maintains pressure for an immediate cease fire without political pre-conditions.						
99.	The United Nations is actively seeking a political formula to end the hostilities.						
100.	Leadership of "non-status quo" side is anxious to take the conflict to the United Nations.						
101.	Leadership of the "status quo" side is anxious to take the conflict to the United Nations.						
102.	The U.N. Secretary General urges restraint on both sides.						
103.	One side withdraws from international organiza-tion.						
104.	Security Council members favor cessation of hostilities and negotiated settlement.						
105.	A great power vetoes United Nation Security Council resolution calling on adversaries to respect each other's independence and territorial integrity.						

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Approved

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Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5

## PHASE III-15.

Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5

NOT A FACTOR	A FACTOR	FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE	FACTOR TENDS TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE	NOT PRESENT / NO INFO.	NO INFLUENCE	NOT PRESENT / NO INFO.	FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE
		MUCH	SOME	LITTLE	MUCH	SOME	LITTLE
1. Insufficient information, check box one (1)							
2. If situation not present or true, check box two (2)							
3. If present but no influence, check box three (3)							
4. If a factor, check as appropriate 4,5,6,7,8, or 9							
<b>GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS</b>							
115. Plans for a United Nations force are elaborated and contingents committed.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
116. The U.N. creates a U.N. Force to perform the task for which the "non-status quo" side claimed its action was undertaken.							
117. The U.N. creates a body to make an on-the-spot report and to facilitate resumption of negotiations.							
118. U.N. cease fire resolution results in agreement by adversaries on cease fire.							
119. Both sides agree to have the United Nations ascertain the wishes of population in disputed area.							
120. United Nations provides a focus for world attention to developments in the disputed area.							
121. Debate in the U.N. provides opportunity for many states to register their interest in peaceful settlement.							
122. Regional organization of which adversaries are members offers to mediate the conflict.							

## PHASE III-16.

NOT A FACTOR		A FACTOR							
				MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE
1. Insufficient information, check box one (1)		FACTOR TENDS TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE							
2. Present or true, check box two (2)									
3. Present but no influence, check box three (3)									
4. Not a factor, check as appropriate 4,5,6,7,8, or 9									
GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS		NO INFO.	NOT PRESENT	NO INFLUENCE	NO INFLUENCE	NO INFLUENCE	NO INFLUENCE	NO INFLUENCE	NO INFLUENCE
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
123. International organization body is slow in getting to the disputed area.									
VI. ETHNIC									
* * * * *									
124. Refugees from one side return to carry out raids.									
125. Violence occurs between ethnic groups within country supporting one side.									
126. Riots between ethnic groups in one side raise doubt about the viability of that side.									
127. Ethnic rivalries exist in "non-status quo" side.									
128. Ethnic rivalries exist in "status quo" side.									
129. Both sides are worried about effects of their military activity on hostile ethnic groups in disputed area.									
VII. ECONOMIC									
* * * * *									
130. The "non-status quo" side faces economic problems as a result of hostilities.									

Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5

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## PHASE III-17.

		A FACTOR					
		NOT A FACTOR					
		FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE					
		NO INFLUENCE	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE	MUCH INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE
		NO INFO.	1	2	3	4	5
1.	Insufficient information, check box one (1)	FACTOR TENDS TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE					
2.	If situation not present or true, check box two (2)						
3.	If present but no influence, check box three (3)						
4.	As a factor, check as appropriate 4,5,6,7,8, or 9						
<b>GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS</b>							
132.	The "status quo" side faces economic problems as a result of hostilities.						
133.	Great power ally of "status quo" side threatens it with cut in economic assistance.						
134.	Great power ally of "non-status quo" side threatens it with cut in economic assistance.						
135.	Great powers threaten to withdraw economic aid from both sides unless cease fire instituted.						
136.	Advances by one side threaten important economic resource area of other.						
137.	The costs of hostilities for both sides are becoming burdensome, especially in terms of other desired goals.						

## PHASE III-18.

Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5

		NOT A FACTOR		A FACTOR			
		NO INFLUENCE		FACTOR TENDS TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE		FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE	
		NOT PRESENT	TRUE	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE	MUCH INFLUENCE
		1	2	3	4	5	6
GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS	VIII-INTERNAL-POLITICAL						
1. Insufficient information, check box one (1)	1						
2. Situation not present or true, check box two (2)							
3. Present but no influence, check box three (3)							
4. Factor, check as appropriate 4,5,6,7,8, or 9							
** * * * *							
138. Public opinion on one side rallies in the struggle against the other side.							
139. Public opinion comes to favor the "status quo" side.							
140. Public opinion comes to favor the "non-status quo" side.							
141. The "non-status quo" side creates a rival government.							
142. There is little chance that internal unrest will be triggered by continuation of hostilities.							
143. Internal unrest is likely to be triggered by continuation of hostilities.							
144. Heavy domestic pressure being generated in one side to cease hostilities.							
145. Opposition in one side to domestic policy increases as the scale of violence rises.							

## PHASE III-19.

		A FACTOR			
		NOT A FACTOR		FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE	
				MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE
				LITTLE INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE
				NO INFO.	TRUE/ NOT PRESENT
				NO INFLUENCE	NO INFO.
1.	Insufficient information, check box one (1)				
2.	In situation not present or true, check box two (2)				
3.	Present but no influence, check box three (3)				
4.	A factor, check as appropriate 4,5,6,7,8, or 9				
GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS		1	2	3	4
Leaders of one side assure other side that none of former's regular forces will be used to overthrow latter.					
"Status quo" side moves to counter violence by arrests and strong reprisals.					
The "non-status quo" side wins political concessions.					
From time to time extremist political groups in both sides gain control over policy.					
CHARACTERISTICS OF ONE SIDE * * * * *					
150. One side is able to dramatize its position by an international incident.					
151. "Non-status quo" side's pursuit of its goals by peaceful means has achieved no success.					

PHASE III-20.		A FACTOR	
NOT A FACTOR	PRESENT / NO INFO.	FACTOR TENDS TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE	FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE
1. Insufficient information, check box one (1) 2. If situation not present or true, check box two (2) 3. If present but no influence, check box three (3) 4. If a factor, check as appropriate 4,5,6,7,8, or 9	NO INFLUENCE NOT PRESENT NO INFO.	MUCH INFLUENCE 4 SOME INFLUENCE 5 LITTLE INFLUENCE 6 INFLUENCE 7	LITTLE INFLUENCE 8 SOME INFLUENCE 7 MUCH INFLUENCE 6 INFLUENCE 7
GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS			
"Non-status quo" side's pursuit of its goals by peaceful means has achieved success.			
One side feels a great responsibility for the fate of its proxy forces.			
Some military officers on one side believe that a military solution to the problem is possible.			
Opposition within the "status quo" side reaches into high levels of the military.			
Despite one side's hopes to keep its role covert, its prime role in the military action was widely assumed.			
Splits within one side become open rifts.			
There is emerging within one side a coalition in opposition to the party in power.			
One side is ideologically committed to prolonging the fight.			
The "non-status quo" side's military and territorial objectives appear to be limited.			

## PHASE III-21.

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		A FACTOR					
		NOT A FACTOR					
		FACTOR TENDS TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE			FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE		
		NO INFO.	NOT PRESENT	INFO. TRUE	NO INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	MUCH INFLUENCE
1.	For insufficient information, check box one (1)						
2.	For situation not present or true, check box two (2)						
3.	For present but no influence, check box three (3)						
4.	For a factor, check as appropriate 4,5,6,7,8, or 9						
GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS		1	2	3	4	5	6
161.	The "non-status quo" side's military and territorial objectives do not appear to be limited.						
162.	The main thrust of one side's policy is to isolate the other side from its base of support.						
163.	Prolongation of hostilities erodes resources of one side.						
164.	The "status quo" side misinterprets the nature of events in disputed area.						
165.	One side becomes over-confident and tries to seek a military solution.						
166.	"Non-status quo" side resorts to guerrilla war.						
167.	Initial mission of one side conceived as being limited and for humanitarian reasons.						

PHASE III-22.

Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5

PHASE III-23.

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Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5

## PHASE III-24.

Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000500010012-5

		NOT A FACTOR		A FACTOR			
1.	insufficient information, check box one (1)	NOT PRESENT	TRUE	FACTOR TENDS TOWARD INCREASED VIOLENCE		FACTOR TENDS AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE	
2.	situation not present or true, check box two (2)	NO INFO.	NO INFLUENCE				
3.	present but no influence, check box three (3)						
4.	a factor, check as appropriate 4,5,6,7,8, or 9						
GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICTS		1	2	3	MUCH INFLUENCE	SOME INFLUENCE	LITTLE INFLUENCE
ACTIONS OR CONTROLS IN THE DISPUTED AREA				4	5	6	7
* * * * *							
Initial hostilities fail to delay change in status quo.							
184 Geography of disputed area makes it difficult to prevent one side from bringing in reinforcements.							
185 Practical geographical limits in the disputed area make extended operations difficult.							
186 One side has a sanctuary in an area whose terrain makes it difficult for other side to reach.							
187 The geographic isolation of the disputed area compels the "non-status quo" side to conduct hostilities at relatively low level.							
188 The nature or location of the "non-status quo" side's attack weakens its claim to be supporting groups in disputed area.							
189.							

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